



Telephone: (212) 446-2300
Email: jischiller@bsfllp.com

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VIA ECF

The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield
District Court Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of New York
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007

Re: Farmer v. Indyke et al., Case No. 19-cv-10475

Dear Judge Schofield,

Pursuant to Individual Rules III.A.1 and III.C.2, Plaintiff Annie Farmer hereby responds to Defendants' request for a pre-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion "to dismiss" Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is procedurally improper. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' anticipated motion in its entirety.¹

I. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York Law.

Plaintiff's claims are timely under the Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 214-g, which says that:

[E]very civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, . . . is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced . . . not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section.

The Complaint alleges that Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses under Article 130 of the Penal Law, and that those actions were committed against Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 81. Further, Plaintiff filed the Complaint approximately three months after the CVA's revival period began on August 14, 2019, well within the one-year window. Defendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiffs' claims are therefore timely.

¹ To the extent the Court allows Defendants to file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests 30 days from the date of Defendants' motion to file an opposition, with Defendants' reply brief due 10 days thereafter.



Plaintiff's claims are also timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, *the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence the civil action.*" (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on August 29, 2019. Compl. ¶ 40. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later, the action is timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 215(8)(a)'s application to these facts are meritless.

First, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was not named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR § 215(8)(a) is "plain, clear and unambiguous" that it does *not* require that the plaintiff be "the victim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed." *Clemens v. Nealon*, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).

Second, Defendants' narrow construction of § 215(8)(a)'s "event or occurrence" language is improper, especially in light of the breadth of Epstein's indictment. The charges were not limited to crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex trafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, "*including* minor victims identified herein." Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y. Indictment) ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added). As another example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking of "numerous individuals . . . including but not limited to Minor Victim-1." *Id.* ¶ 24. The Indictment was targeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. *See Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.*, 925 F.3d 53, 56–57, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (guilty plea conceding "knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan" allowed victims of the atrocities in Sudan use 215(8)(a) because causes of action arose out of defendant's general conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions put in place to stop atrocities). Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common scheme, they fall within CPLR § 215(8)(a).

The cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were much narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. *See Christodoulou v. Terdeman*, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced only in connection with events on February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993); *Gallina v. Thatcher*, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment "charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates"). Epstein's Indictment was much broader, covering sexual abuse that occurred "over the course of many years" "from *at least in or about 2002*, up to and including *at least in or about 2005.*" S.D.N.Y. Indictment ¶¶ 1–2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added). Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a) because the scheme the Indictment targeted is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arise.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202. This argument fails for two reasons. First, CPLR § 202 only applies if a Plaintiff's cause of action accrues outside of New York. But the term "accrued" in CPLR § 202 means "the time when, and the place where, the plaintiff *first had the right to bring the cause of action.*" *Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp.*, 715 N.E.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. 1999) (emphasis added).



Epstein first injured Plaintiff in New York when he forcibly touched her in a movie theater when she was a minor. Compl. ¶ 54. Plaintiff's claims therefore accrued in New York, and CPLR § 202 does not apply.

Second, even if New York's borrowing statute did apply and Plaintiff's claims were otherwise untimely, they would still not be barred because the CVA provides for a revival window of civil claims "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." CPLR § 214-g. Again, Defendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's claims. Because CPLR § 202 would impose a period of limitation contrary to the CVA, it does not apply to Plaintiff's claims and those claims are not subject to any New Mexico statute of limitations.

II. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling.

Even if Plaintiff's claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of limitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Defendants assert that Plaintiff "fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel." Dkt. 17 at 2. But the Complaint alleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies "where it would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense," *Zumpano v. Quinn*, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006), due to "deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct," *Zoe G. v. Frederick F.G.*, 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his co-conspirators manipulated their victims using "financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands"; that Plaintiff did not immediately tell anyone about the sexual assaults out of fear for herself and her family; and that Defendants repeatedly threatened Plaintiff's sister to try to prevent her from reporting their crimes. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 70, 72, 76. The allegations concerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of his victims (and Plaintiff specifically) easily provide the requisite "extraordinary circumstances" for equitable tolling.

Because equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants' attempt to resolve the issue at the motion to dismiss stage is inappropriate, and any motion challenging whether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have conducted discovery. *See, e.g., Carelock v. United States*, 2015 WL 5000816, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015).

III. The Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery

Federal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's claims (battery and intentional infliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be dealt with at a later stage of this litigation. *See, e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC*, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying "motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive damages as procedurally premature").



Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joshua I. Schiller

David Boies, Esq.
Joshua I. Schiller, Esq.
Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq.

cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)